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Between 1911 and 1939 the Natal coal industry initiated and
developed a labour policy which aimed at having a significant
proportion of its labour force living as permanent colliers with
their families in the vicinity of the mines. This was in direct
contradiction to the gold and coal mining industries in the
Transvaal, which were almost entirely dependent on migrant
labour, and government policy, which favoured migrant labour and
discouraged the existence of black families outside the reserves.
In the early days of the gold mining industry the question of
providing a married quarters system on a large scale had been
considered and rejected primarily because of the sheer size of
the labour requirements which approached the 200 000 mark in the
1920s. 1 Land was diff icult to obtain in the urbanised
vicinities of the gold mines. Another major consideration was
the effect of continuous employment on health, and the danger of
early incapacitation through sil icosis. ^ '
By contrast the labour requirements of the Ratal coal mines were
relat ively modest, not exceeding 20 000 during this period. '
Moreover, most of the co l l i er i e s were situated on farms which
coal companies had either bought, or leased for the purposes of
conducting mining operations. Many of the original black
inhabitants of these farms continued to reside there, and worked
on the collieries. 4 in addition, Northern Natal was the scene
of the largest concentrations of black-owned land in the
province, and many co l l i er ies were situated in the vicinity of
such land, and also of mission-owned farms. Black land-owners
readily provided accommodation for black labourers, particularly
with the passage of time, when increasing subdivisions made
'labour farming' a necessary source of income. Some white
farmers, too, permitted such tenants on their farms. Until the
1950s, when pneumoconiosis was f inal ly recognised as a health
hazard, coal mining was considered to be a healthy occupation and
indeed, i t was often the case that miners, suffering from
incipient s i l icosis , were sent to the coal mines to recover. ^
But the most important explanation for the divergence in;labour
policies lay in the particular conditions that governed the Natal
coal industry virtually from i ts inception in 1889, through to
the early 1950s.
Although superior in quality to Transvaal coal, Natal coal was
excluded from the lucrative and expanding Rand market at an early
stage because of higher mining costs, and a less favourable
geographical location. As Natal's own domestic market was
limited, and characterised by cut-throat competition, the coal
industry was forced to turn to the bunker and export trade as the
main sources of profitability. This was a precarious base on
which to build an industry. Natal coal had to find a place in
the Eastern market in competition with superior northern
hemisphere coal , and had to contend with the ris ing coal
industries of Eastern producers such as India and Japan. The
normal condition of the Natal coal trade could be described as
one of 'struggle'. It was only when misfortune, such as strikes
or wara, befell other coal producing countries of the world, that
the Natal coal trade experienced some degree of prosperity, and
the only really sustained periods of prosperity occurred during
:
 the years of the First and Second World Wars. Factors such as
these imparted alternating periods of depression and prosperity
to the industry. To these gyrations were added the problems of
the distant location of the Natal coal fields from the port, an
inadequate transport infrastructure, and a chronic shortage of
railway trucks. As the friable nature of Natal coal militated
against stockpiling at the mine, and dictated the need to work
from seam to truck, lack of trucks could result in the mines
standing idle for hours in the day, or days at a time. From a
labour perspective these conditions meant that periods of
retrenchment alternated with times of acute labour shortages,
making i t extremely diff icult to compute labour requirements
precisely, and raising the problem of what to do with the labour
force during times of enforced idleness. Lack of sustained
prosperity and the knowledge that good times were invariably
succeeded by bad, inculcated an intense cost consciousness among
coal owners, which influenced a l l facets of mining pol icy ,
whether i t involved labour matters, or the actual choice of
mining methods. As Robert Campbell, the general manager of the
Natal Navigation group, told the magistrate at Dundee:
'The rich coal deposits in the Transvaal have brought
the prof i ts of the Natal coal mines to a very f ine
point with the resu l t that the Natal mines are unable
to finance a proper recruiting system... ' (6)
His remarks could equally well have applied to the provision of
decent l i v i n g and working conditions on the c o l l i e r i e s which,
notwithstanding some improvement, remained appalling well into
the 1950s.
In the colonial period the Natal c o l l i e r i e s were to some extent
protected from the need to offer attractive labour.conditions as
serious competitors in the labour market, by the government's
pol icy of re s tr i c t ing the outflow of labour from the colony as
far as poss ib le , and, more importantly, by the decis ion to make
extensive and increasing use of indentured Indian labour from the
1890s onwards. Indentured Indians provided a s tab le , s e t t l e d
core of cheap labour, and coal owners recruited the balance.of
their requirements, as and when needed, through a variety of
labour agents. This appeared to offer an adequate, i f not
idea l , so lut ion to the d i f f i c u l t i e s confronting coal owners.
The government of India's decision, under pressure from the Union
government?, to stop indentured Indian immigration in 1911 caused
panic-stricken coal owners to moot wild schemes, including the
recruit ing of labour from as far a f i e ld as Japan. In the end
they found a so lut ion on their own doorstep. They hit on the
idea of expanding the existing core of settled blacks on co l l i ery
farms, or neighbouring farms, by transforming transient recruits
into permanent c o l l i e r s , who would regard the mines and their
environs as 'home'. The instrument of this transformation was
the notorious 'token system', which was a form of debt peonage,
and which came to be practised on some 85$ of the Natal coal
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mines. °
In practice, the system worked as follows: a recruit would arrive
at the mine already in debt to the extent of two to four pounds
for cash advances and his rai l fare. He would immediately need
to purchase a blanket, a billycan and boots, although most black
miners seemed to dispense with the l a t t e r requirement. The
compound manager would send him to the concession storekeeper who
would issue him with tokens. These tokens were known as
' sk i l l ivaans ' meaning ' trash money'. They were issued in
denominations of 3d, 6d and 1/-, and would be used by the new
recruit to purchase his requirements. In due course he would
feel the need to supplement his rations with bread, meat or beer
from the beer h a l l , or purchase items such as soap, matches and
tobacco for his personal comfort. More tokens would be issued by
the storekeeper. These advances would be recovered subsequently
on pay day when the recruit had completed his t icket of 30
shifts . By this stage l i t t l e or nothing of his pay would be
le f t , and to see him through the next ticket of his contract,
more tokens would have to be acquired, and so the recruit would
have stepped on to a treadmill of debt. He would have l i t t l e or
no money to remit home. He would have no money to buy a beast
for lobola 'so that he can take his place in the tr ibe to which
he belongs.' Having no money for his own rail fare home, or to
provide food for the journey, he would tend to stay at the mines.
In this way, for instance, T. Nzimande found himself chained to
Northfield colliery near Glencoe:
'I did work on the mine since I was a small boy, but I
could not leave the mine to go and look for work
elsewhere because I would have starved on the road. I
had no cash on me.1 (9)
The Rev. D.J. Kambule of the African Ethiopian Church a l l eged
that:
•By reason of the temptation afforded by the token-
>. credit system, the Natives, who are recruited from a l l
parts of the Union, are unable to save a penny either
. for themselves or their dependents. Nor do a majority
of them ever see their homes again.1 (10)
Wives and children l e f t behind became, in the words of Chief
Robert Kunene of Boschhoek in the Vaschbank va l ley , 'widows when
their husbands are a l i v e ' and 'orphans while their fathers are
yet a l i v e . ' 11 C.L. Cope, the inspector of nat ive labour for
Dundee, recorded a case where enquiries were s t i l l being received
from the family of a man who had been gone eleven years to the
mines, and who had never once remitted any money home. 12 j n
such cases new l iaisons were often formed with women residing at,
or in the v ic ini ty of the mines. Lucy Vil ikazi , for instance,
married her husband when he was working at the Durban Navigation
No. 2 c o l l i e r y . She asserted: 'My husband always buys in
tokens. I have never seen cash.' 1 ' In some cases wives
followed their husbands to the mines. Elias Mkwanase explained:
'Some of the Natives' wives have come to reside in the
neighbourhood of the mines where their husbands work to
try and get a l i t t l e money from their husbands because
in the kraals they do not receive anything.' (14)
Samuel Lazarus, who founded Mines Stores (Natal) Ltd. in 1911,
with branch stores on several Natal mines, i s thought to have
i n i t i a l l y devised the token system at about that time. But i t s
subsequent development and refinement was the work of c lose
collaboration between mine managements and storekeepers, with not
a l i t t l e help from Ignatius de Jager, inspector of native labour
for the Dundee district. De Jager claimed to have improved the
system and established i t s subsequent form in 1919, by having
token issues endorsed on the working tickets of the colliers, and
also entered in books held by the storekeepers in order to
obviate disputes about degrees of indebtedness which had hitherto
characterised the system. 5^
Most coal owners and mine managers assiduously supported the
storekeepers in the operation of the token system. Firstly they
assisted them in establishing trading monopolies on the various
mines. This process was well i l lus t ra ted by the case of the
Dundee Coal Company's mine at Burnside. When Farouz Khan wanted
to transfer his re ta i l licence from the Company's old mine at
Dundee to 'Volker', a neighbouring farm to Burnside, Mine Stores
opposed the transfer. While the Company did not lodge an
of f ic ia l objection, the Company's s o l i c i t o r , Livingston,
undertook to explain the position privately to the licensing
officer. When local farmers came to the compound to sell goats
and sheep to the Indian workers for slaughter purposes, Mine
Stores asked the Company to put a stop to the practice on the
grounds that i t interfered with their trading rights. The
Company's sol ici tors argued that while there was no legal
obligation to do so, there was a good moral obligation, and so
the farmers were asked to desist. The attempt of an Indian to
open a butchery adjacent to Burnside No. 2 mine was foiled in
1916. When the Company had omitted to register trading rights
granted by the Marais family over the whole of Burnside, members
of the family disposed of the surface rights without indicating
that the trading r ights were excluded. Mine Stores was
accordingly faced with the task of getting the trading rights
from the owners of the various subdivisions of the farm. Ben
Sokehill, the general manager, was instructed by the Company to
oppose the granting of any trading licences in these areas, and
to place a l l the obstacles he possibly could in the way of those,
other than Mine Stores, endeavouring to trade. '"
Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, mine management
provided storekeepers with f a c i l i t i e s for the recovery of debts.
Although the deduction of cash from labourers' wages for payment
to a third party was i l l e g a l under the Native Labour Regulation
Act of 1911> a system was devised which e f f e c t i v e l y got round
this prohibition. On pay day the mine secretary would hand over
the f u l l cash wage due to the worker. But the worker would in
turn be required to hand i t over to the storekeeper, or his
representat ive, s i t t i n g at an adjacent desk. The amount of
money owing to the store would be deducted and the remainder, i f
any, handed back to the worker. Although mine managements and
storekeepers claimed that the repayment of debts was voluntary,
V.H.M. Barrett, deputy inspector of mines, observed that
'a native faced with mine o f f i c i a l s and storekeepers
agents in the pay o f f i ce has l i t t l e option in the
matter and the method of payment does not d i f fer in
effect from that of a stoporder.1 (17)
The token system made concession store-keeping on the Natal
c o l l i e r i e s a highly profitable undertaking. Robert Shapiro, who
bought Nine Stores (Natal) l td . from the Lazarus brothers in
1919> said of the token system:
' it means our business was practically on a cash basis -
no bad debts. ... This system influenced m« in buying
the business. It i s an important factor at a l l the
Mine Stores.'
He estimated that of the 9 500 black workers employed on the
Natal collieries in 1935, some 60-705* availed themselves of the
token system. His view was that
'A Native cannot keep his money when he gets i t and if
not collected at once he wastes i t . 1 (18)
The monopoly conditions afforded by exclusive trading rights on
mine property, and the use of tokens which could only be
exchanged at the store of issue, allowed for excessive profits
to be made. For instance a blanket costing 5/- in token money
at a mine store could be bought for 3/6 at an Indian store.19
Boots issued at a cost price of 9/9 to col l iers at the Natal
Cambrian colliery, where the token system was not allowed by the
contro l l ing company, J.C.I., cost double that amount at a
concession store. 20
Such was the support given by mine management to storekeepers
that several government officials suspected them of having an
unhealthy financial stake in the stores. 21 For instance, an
assistant inspector of mines, D.H. Eowden, told the Native
Affairs Commission in 1938 that
'We a l l know in a round-about way, although you cannot
prove i t , that the Compound Manager and the Management
get a side cut. It is l ibellous to say so, but they
hinted those things themselves and iftheydo not do i t
they are fired.' (22)
But the report of the Native Affairs Commission of 1938 more
accurately captured their motives in these words:
'These permanent Natives are regarded as the "back
bone" of the coal mining labour force; and the
expressed and obvious desire of the mine managements is
to increase that permanent source of manpower by
turning t h i s "floating" worker into the path of
detribalisation as quickly as possible. Any scheme,
therefore, which wil l train for the future a colony of
s k i l l e d c o l l i e r s , l i v i n g with their families on the
mines, ia favourably regarded by the mine owners.' (23)
Hugh Williamson, manager of the Burnside col l iery, put the matter
succinctly - 'If you keep them on the mine you retain their
labour.' 24 Robert Campbell argued that
'The person giving credit must be protected as credit i s
responsible for us being able to retain our trained
men.* '
In his view the token system 'anchors the family on the mine and
enables them to l i v e a settled contented l i f e . ' 24- Given the
conditions of the Natal coal trade when i t could take from five
to as many as twelve weeks to earn a t icket of 30 s h i f t s , the
token system did make i t possible to retain labour. 25 This
was particularly the case when on most co l l i er ies no rations were
provided for children and mealie meal only was issued to
women. 26 By 1938 i t was estimated that about 60^ of the
labour force on the larger Natal c o l l i e r i e s consisted of
permanent co l l i ers , and the percentage at Hlobane was estimated
as high as 75$. 27 At the level of compound manager, however,
i t seems true that of f ic ia ls did have a material interest in that
they were either paid by the storekeeper, or were given a
percentage of the amounts spent by the labourers at the store. 28
They were a l so , as Bowden pointed out, faced with the threat of
dismissal by mine managers i f they failed to co-operate with the
system. 29
The token system functioned by explo i t ing the improvidence of
workers. Easy credit was ' l i t e r a l l y thrust1 upon them. Bowden
explained the process in these words:
'When a boy goes to a mine o f f i ce and asks for money he
i s not welcome. If he asks for an advance, say of £1,
they say "It i s causing trouble. You had better take
10/-", but at a Jew store , i f he asks for 10 / - they
give him £1. • (30)
A col l ier at the Durban Navigation co l l i er ies told Bowden:
'I have been here for six years. That i s a l l I have
got [pointing to the clothes that he was wearing]. I
am the f i r s t to be there for tokens. I am mesmerised
by th i s thing; I can just tear i t off and I get what I
want. • (31 )
There also appears to have been some element of compulsion in
persuading workers to make use of the token system. Archdeacon
Lee of St Augustine's, Rorkes Drift , said of assert ions that
c o l l i e r s were entirely free agents as far as purchases from the
stores were concerned:
'... every man i s a free agent in the matter of l i f e and
death, but he does not have much choice. He ei ther
l i v e s or d i e s , and in th i s case he either goes to the
mine and f a l l s in with the system, or he does not
go.' (32)
A major source of perpetual indebtedness under the token system
was beer on credit in the beer h a l l s on the c o l l i e r i e s . Under
the Natal Act 23 of 1908, which aimed to control the use and
provision of beer, mine managers were permitted to grant licences
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for the manufacture and sa l e of beer. Licences were usual ly
granted to the concession storekeepers. The Liquor Act (No. 30)
of 1928 vested the granting of l i c e n c e s in the minister of
justice and he.permitted the continuation of the licences granted
under the o ld Act on the c o l l i e r i e s . 33 Although the
conditions governing these licences prescribed cash sales only,
the storekeepers claimed that the minister, Tielman Roos, had
assured them in an interview in 1928 that i t was not intended to
interfere with the system of using tokens, and that the provision
for cash sales would not be enforced in co l l i ery beer hal l s . 34
However, V.H.M. Barrett, deputy inspector of mines, claimed that
the reason for non-enforcement was that beer was considered to be
a necessary food for blacks. 35
The ef fect of the supply' of beer on credit to workers was
described by Joel Maduna, lnduna at the Dundee Coal Company's By-
Products Works, in these words:
'If they spent cash on drinks he would not spend so much
money as they do with the ski l l ivaans because, when a l l
their money had been spent each one w i l l say: I w i l l
drink on pay-day. With the token system he drinks
even when he has ho money.' (36)
On most Natal c o l l i e r i e s the beer h a l l s were s t r a t e g i c a l l y
located between the mine shaft or adit and the compounds.
'Natives', observed the inspector of native labour for Dundee,
'after coming off sh i f t throng these p laces , animated
doubtless to some extent by a sense of temporary l o s s
of v i t a l i t y and a conceivable desire for companionship
and conviviality . . . ' (37)
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In the opinion of the Kaffir Beer Committee of 1938 the warmth of
the beer halls, where winter fires were sometimes provided, were
a major node of attraction away from the 'uninviting, comfortless
and unhygienic' compounds which characterised most of the Natal
collieries. 38
Although the law prescribed that the alcoholic content of beer
sold at the hal ls should not exceed 2%, i t appeared that the
potency of the brew sold exceeded this level. Robert Perguson,
manager of the Natal Cambrian col l iery told Lugg, the chief
native commissioner,
'I very much doubt that the alcoholic content of kaffir
beer as required by law is observed because Natives get
drunk very readi ly on i t and i t appears to be
exceedingly potent.1 (39)
Black col l ie rs generally referred to the beer supplied as
' i s i p i l i t i ' or ' sp i r i t s ' , and witnesses to the Kaffir Beer
Committee of 1938 alleged that carbide was added to the brew to
increase potency, and also aloe ash to induce thirs t so that more
beer would be drunk. 40 M.E.L. Maling, representing Chief
Solomon, told the Native Economic Commission,
'Personally, I think that the beer which is brewed on
the mines is very bad, and I think if a Medical Man
were appointed to examine those natives who partake of
that beer, i t would be found that their insides were
all burnt out.1 (41 )
Regulations governing colliery beer halls did not make provision
for sex segregation in the halls, unlike those established under
the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. As Robert Campbell
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argued, 'Hen must have women in the same way as they must have
beer.' 42 A characteristic feature of Natal col l iery beer
halls was the women thronging around at a l l times of the day.
Many of these were prostitutes, inevitably attracted to mining
centres. Bowden, in his evidence to the Native Affairs
Commission, referred to the 'low type of women' who
'immediately collar [the co l l i er ] when he gets tokens
and he is whipped into the beer hall . I have seen it
myself. At 10 o'clock in the morning I have seen them
on the mines, waiting for the boys coming off the
shift, and making a row.' (43)
Piet Africa, an induna at Steenkoolspruit, referred to the
phenomenon of loose women as
'a very painful thorn in Natives, and i t lowers our
Nation, because these women drink and forget whether
they are females, and there is a lot. of prostitute in
this , as they get drinks from any man who affords
buying for them, whilst their husbands are a l l at work
in the mine.' (44)
G.B. Molefe, a former clerk at the By-Products Works, referred to
these 'women of the street', who 'by various temptations . . . used
to make men go to these canteens and spend more tokens.' 45
The report of the Kaffir Beer Committee vividly described some of
the Natal colliery beer halls in these words:
'At one or two places which were in "full blast" the
presence of coal-blackened Natives of a l l sorts and
descriptions, including crippled and deformed and
female hags and harridans, with their ev i l and
distorted faces, conjured up a picture of the
inferno.' (46)
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While the Committee concluded that the beer halls were 'an evil,
a public nuisance and menace to natives, both morally and
physically1 47, storekeepers referred to the "law-abiding manner'
in which they conducted the beer ha l l s . They claimed that by
supplying beer in reasonable quantities under strict supervision
and control, they were performing a social duty, by inhibiting
excessive drinking and assisting the authorities in coping with
i l l i c i t liquor sell ing and brewing. 48 Most mine managers
supported the beer halls as a means of controlling labour during
the weekends. Robert Campbell, for instance, claimed that prior
to the advent of the beer ha l l s , i t was customary for 50-100
colliers to be short on a Monday morning at a colliery employing
600-700 men. With the token system, however, which denied
workers access to ready cash, they tended to stick to the mining
property and were usually available for work on the Monday. 49
Of this attitude the Report of the Native Affairs Commission
commented somewhat drily,
'the idea that a drunken col l ie r today is a working
collier tomorrow is not altogether absent.' (50)
The one dissenting voice among mine managers came from Robert
Ferguson of the Natal Cambrian col l iery, where a beer hall
existed but the token system did not operate. He saw the beer
halls as the root of the trouble on the collieries, and favoured
total abolition and the substitution of a free ration of beer.
But his hands were tied because his company, by agreement, had to
permit trading rights. He argued somewhat prophetically,
'If tokens were abolished and the beer question not
dealt with, matters would s t i l l be the same.' (51)
Although various commissions and committees of enquiry in the
1930s would reveal black abhorrence of the token system, serious
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criticism only surfaced in the context of the depression years of
the early 1930s. Prior to th i s c o l l i e r s seldom openly voiced
criticism of the system because dismissal or victimisation could
be the consequence. 52 For instance, Lucy Vilikazi's-husband
l o s t his Job at D.N.C. after she had given evidence against the
token aystem. 53 Moreover much depended on the at t i tudes of
inspectors of native labourers as intermediaries between the
workers and the authorit ies . In the 1920s the inspector of
native labour in the Dundee d i s t r i c t was I.W. de Jager, himself
one of the architects of the token system and staunch defender
thereof, even in retirement. He saw nothing irregular in the
token system which he deemed to be an e f f i c i e n t method of
accounting. He viewed the provision of beer as a 'native right1
and the beer hall arrangements as
1
 'n middel om die nature l te red van roeke lose
verkwisting van sy verdienste.' (54)
His counterpart in the Vryheid d i s t r i c t , C.R. Eagar, dismissed
the claims that a l l the wages were wasted at the mine stores and
beer .ha l l s as ' fr ivo lous ' . 55 in 1934 de Jager was succeeded
by C.L. Cope in the Dundee d i s t r i c t . Cope was a scrupulous
off icial who was above receiving bribes from the storekeepers. 56
Aware of abuses in the token system, he approached his Vryheid
counterpart, Ben Gildenhuys, to devise ways of eliminating them.
'Unless you and I co-operate',, he wrote to Gildenhuys,
' i t w i l l be use less for me alone to represent the matter
to the Government as very large vested interests would
•be threatened resulting in a natural opposition by a l l
concerned.1
Among the things he and Gildenhuys tried to do was to re s t r i c t
beer sales to a cash basis , and to secure a compulsory deferred
pay system. 57 The director of native labour in Johannesburg
was himself opposed to the token system, but in the absence of a
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legal remedy, except in the case of beer sales, he favoured
trying to secure changes through negotiations with coal owners,
but considered the depressed conditions of the coal trade in the
early and middle thirties an inopportune time to bring the matter
forward. 58
Inspectors of mines could also be expected to be cr i t ics of the
token system because of the implications for accident statistics
that drunken col l iers would have. Certainly D.H. Bowden, the
assistant inspector of mines, emerged as an outspoken cr i t ic of
the system in his evidence to the various commissions and
committees of enquiry. Not only was he an outspoken critic; he
also attempted vigorously to see to the enforcement of various
compromise agreements arising out of opposition to the token
system, even to the extent of driving his car over the veld to
avoid look-outs posted on the roads to warn col l ie r ies of his
coming. 59
The very conditions which made the director of native labour
reluctant to take action against the token system brought public
criticism to a head. A major part of the explanation for this
was that tokens had become a medium of exchange in the coal
mining dis tr ic ts . Farmers, black, white and Indian, who
attempted to sell their produce to colliers could only get tokens
in exchange. Convicted criminals tried to pay their fines with
tokens. Tokens appeared in church collection plates, and were
even offered as admission fees to concerts. 60 Amidst the
hardships of the depression years the storekeepers were seen to
be waxing fat. The fact that most, if not a l l , the storekeepers
were Jewish emigres from Russia and Eastern Europe added an anti-
Semitic tone to some of the opposition, which appeared totally to
obscure the fact that Christian coal owners and mine managers
made the token system possible, and avidly aided and abetted in
i t s operation. D.J. Kambule wrote of the concession
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storekeepers 'who are a l l Jews out to fleece our people as much
as they can . . . ' 6 1 A co l l i er at Hlobane told Ben Gildenhuys
that 'We risk our l i v e s in the mine and a l l our money i s eaten
up by the Jews.' 6 2
'Outside' storekeepers complained b i t t e r l y of the unfair
competition from the mine stores' monopoly. 63 For instance, a
general dealer store, Biggermans, in Paulpietereburg appealed to
the minister of justice to 'save us from ruination.1 A cutting
edge to their despair was given by the diminished output and
retrenchments at Dumbe colliery, which reduced the spending power
of coll iers in the Paulpietereburg region by £600 a month after
August 1931. At the same time the recently equipped
Hakateeskop colliery which had paid £700 a month in salaries and
wages, was closed down. 6 4
Farmers associations in the Vryheid area protested and appealed
and mobilised their member for Parliament, E.G. Jansen, and
Senator WeseeIs to take up their case. 65 y. Blrkenstock of
the farm 'Hlobane' wrote to the Minister of Finance:
'0ns reken £40 tot £50 duisend pond word gespandeer aan
arbeid per jaar waarvan nog die aarbeiders nog die boer
voordeel trek. Dit i s 'n absolute monopolie tussen
die mynbase en die winkeliers.' (66)
The Congress of the National Party condemned the token system, as
did the Joint Councils of Europeans and Natives in the Vryheid
and Dundee d is tr ic t s , and the Natal Indian Congress. The
Transkei Bunga delegation to the c o l l i e r i e s in July 1931 urged
the aboliton of the token system. So did the Native Economic
Commission of 1930-1932. Organisations ranging from the South
African I n s t i t u t e of Race Re la t ions through to the
Pieteraaritzburg Society for the Welfare of Natives pleaded for
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action against the token system. 67 A leading ar t ic le in the
Natal Witness argued that
'However honest the motive or dis interested the
intention, the principle is base and falls far short of
any standards of labour conditions the European worker
would accept for himself • ' (68)
Amidst this crescendo of opposition, government officials, coal
owners and storekeepers squared up for a long and laborious fight
over tokens and beer hal ls . In the aftermath of the Rex v
Barmana case in 1932 which saw an Umzimkulu trader being
convicted for trading in metal discs under the British Coinage
Act of 1870 as applied to the Union of South Africa 69, the
Native Affairs Department extracted a promise from the Natal Coal
Owners' Society to persuade storekeepers to do away with the
token system by 1 April' 1932. Storekeepers, however,
interpreted this promise as merely one to discard metal discs,
which they replaced with embossed paper tokens. 70 Licenoees
were then warned in 1933 that the sale of beer on credit was an
infraction of the Liquor Act of 1928. 71 This was ignored.
Government officials then cast about for appropriate legislative
action. Eventually a decision was made, pending legis la t ive
action, to frame regulations under the Native Administration Act
of 1927, sections of which empowered the governor general to deal
with matters affecting the welfare of blacks. 72 jy Government
Notice 1087, published on 3 August 1934, to become effective on 1
September, the use of tokens was prohibited, as was the presence
of storekeepers or their representatives in mine pay offices. 73
This generated howls of protest from mine managers and
storekeepers. Robert Shapiro asked for action to be suspended
pending an interview with the minister of native affairs on 14
September. The director of native labour declined to do this.
While some mines observed the new regulations, many did not.
Ben Gildenhuys, for instance, reported on his v i s i t to the pay
office at Hlobane:
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'in my teenwoordigheid het [Glutz] die hardverdiende
loon van die arme akepsels ingepalm. In die meeste
g e v a l l e het die arteiders die Mynkantoor sonder 'n
pennie verlaat.' (75)
At Northfield Col l iery , Robert Shapiro de l ibera te ly courted
arrest with a view to a t e s t case so that the shopkeepers'
contention that the regulations were u l t ra v ires could be
considered. On 24 September 1934 A.S. Dunlop, the Dundee
magistrate, ruled that the regulations were indeed ultra vires,
arguing that
'I do not consider that the legislature ever intended to
grant power to the Governor-General to make regulations
to contro l a few i s o l a t e d European traders from
carrying on their lawful business In a non-native
area.1 (76)
Witnesses for the defence in the case included several mine
managers and compound managers. ?? Dunlop tended to sympathise
with the coal owners. A year after his ruling he explained to
the secretary for native a f fa ir s , D.L. Smit, why the token
system was necessary in Natal when i t did not exist on the Reef.
He argued that
' . . . the Natal Coal Mines i s ( s i c ) a s t r u g g l i n g
industry. ... the Natal mines are unable to finance a
proper recruiting system, and thus have diff iculty in
obtaining suf f i c i ent labour. With the aid of the
present system, Mr. Campbell holds that they have
worked up a fair supply of permanent labour, who look
upon the mines as their homes.1 (78)
Although the attorney general of Natal thought that the wording
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of the regulations was 'far from satisfactory', the case was
taken on appeal to the Supreme Court which ruled- that the
regulations were 'bad for uncertainty1 and left the question of
the actual powers of the governor general unsettled. 79
While conceeding that legislation would indeed be necessary, the
secretary for native affairs decided first to call a meeting with
the storekeepers to ascertain their views. 80 After a process
of hard bargaining, punctuated by pleas for extensions and
concessions by storekeepers and mine managers, i t was finally
decided that storekeepers could issue tokens for up to 50# of a
col l ier ' s wage, and against the remaining portion tokens to the
value of 7/6 could be granted for the purchase of beer. 81 As
the collier's wages tended to range between two and three pounds
for a working ticket, this represented an enormous concession to
the storekeepers. Notwithstanding this , by March 1937 i t was
clear that these arrangements were 'practical ly a dead le t te r '
82, a situation assisted by the appointment of W.N. Engelbrecht,
'a very weak reed', in succession to Cope as inspector for native
labour in the Dundee d i s t r i c t . 83 The fa i lu re of"the
compromise, together with pointed questions asked by Arthur
Marwick in parliament, prompted the decision to send the chief
native commissioner, H.C. Lugg, personally to investigate and
report on the token system in April 1937. 84 Lugg's
recommendations were unequivocal. The token system should be
abolished. Beer licences should be removed from concession
storekeepers, and mine owners empowered to make and sell beer at
cost. Beer sales on Sundays should be prohibited. 85 .As i t
was too late in the session to enact legislation to give effect
to Lugg's recommendations, and a proclamation could not be
contemplated given the uncertainty of the powers conferred by the
Native Administration Act, the Native Affairs Commission was
instructed to visit the coal mines during the recess in order to
furnish recommendations as to what to do. 86 After further
delays occasioned by occupation with land purchases under the
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Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, the N.A.C. f i n a l l y v i s i t e d
Natal in January 1938 to undertake a simultaneous enquiry into
the token system and the land question. 87 The Commission
delivered i t s report on 1 June 1938.
An interest ing feature of the report was the finding that a
system which had i n i t i a l l y been devised as a means of acquiring
and retaining labour, had in due course generated such widespread
aversion throughout the reserves of Zululand and Natal., that
chiefs and heads of famil ies were dissuading their people from
going to the coal mines. The report claimed that
'only those natives recruited at a distance who have no
knowledge of the conditions they w i l l have to contend
with can be obtained.1 (88)
Finding the charges l e v e l l e d against the token system to be
substant ia l ly true, the Commission recommended that i t be
declared i l l e g a l , that storekeepers be banned from mine pay
o f f i c e s , and mine employees prohibited from ass i s t ing in debt
c o l l e c t i o n . The sa le of beer for profit should be banned and
ef fec t ive control over s a l e s be ins t i tuted . 89 Effect was
given to these recommendations by the Native Administration
(Amendment) Act of 1939, but at the eleventh hour, O.R. Nel, N.F.
for Newcastle succeeded in drawing some of the teeth of the
proposals by having the clauses concerning beer held over pending
further negotiations with licencees. A committee Headed by C.G.
Thackwray, the magistrate of Bloemfontein, was duly appointed to
investigate the question of the supply of beer on the Natal coal
mines. The report of the committee agreed with the opinions
expressed in the Lugg report and that of the Native Affairs
Commission. It argued firmly that the exist ing system of beer
hal ls should be abolished and made short shrift of any potential
argument concerning 'pecuniary loss to licencees in their vested
interes t s . ' The public good was the guiding principle of the
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Liquor Act which recognised no proprietary rights in a licence.
Mine managements should be licensed to provide beer at cost and
under strict conditions including the exclusion of women from the
beer halls, and the confining of sales of beer to bona fide mine
employees. 90
Although the Native Affairs Department strongly supported the
committee's recommendations, the minister of justice decided to
give the concession beer hal ls 'a final probationary test.1
Some of the committee's recommendations were incorporated into
the conditions governing the licences such as the exclusion of
women, hours of sale, and the fixing of prices by the director of
native labour. 91 The inevitable appeals and deputations by
the licencees followed. After much haggling during which
concessions were granted in again extending slightly the hours of
sale and increasing prices, a weary secretary for native affairs,
D.L. Smit, wrote to O.R. Nel:
'I have had so much bother over the beer licences that
I am anxious to reach f inal i ty , and I do not want any
;
 further representations after we have come to a
conclusion.' (92)
In 1941, Iaigg wrote fruitlessly to Smit:
'So long as the right is enjoyed by Concession Stores,
so long will the evi ls continue. They are a disgrace
to the community and a r e f l e c t i o n on our
administration.' (93)
Eight years later after a ser ies of accidents related to
excessive drinking in mine beer halls had occurred, the manager
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of D.N.C. No. 3 said:
•As long as we have privately controlled "Beer Halls"
with the profit motive behind i t , we wi l l never stop
drunkenness.1 (94)
And, although the token system had been made i l l e g a l in 1939.
beer hal ls continued to blot up the earnings of some workers at
least . A witness giving evidence to an accident enquiry in
April 1943 admitted that after eight years of working at D.N.C.
No. 2 he had nothing because he spent a l l his money in the beer
hall. 9 5
That the abolition of the token system did have an effect on
labour supplies is suggested by the decision of Natal coal owners
finally to set up a central recruiting organisation in 1943, the
Natal Coal Owners Native Labour Association 96, although perhaps
an even more important stimulus was the labour requirement needed
to meet the massive war-related demand for coal. The idea of
centralised recruiting had been mooted as early as 1914, side by
side with the evolution of the token system. But as the token
system gradually had the desired effect of creating a core of
permanent labour, so the feasibility of centralised recruiting
receded, because the schemes proposed involved the payment of
capitation fees for those already resident in the vicinity of
the collieries.
In the 1920s and 1930s, the Natal coal industry was swimming
against the tide of off ic ial pol ic ies , which aimed to promote
migrant labour and saw no permanent place for black workers in
urban or industrial centres. It is ironic that in the decade of
the 1940s when the van Eck, Smit and Pagan reports were
recognising that migrant labour was inefficient, and that black
workers should be stabilised in their areas of work 97, that the
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Natal coal industry should seek to place the recruitment of
migrant labour on a more efficient basis.
Although the proportion of permanent labourers on the Natal
c o l l i e r i e s had declined from 60* in the 1930s to 28* in 1956 98,
they constituted a v i t a l l y important element in the labour force.
The blow, presaged by the v ictory of the National Party in 1948
and the reject ion of the Pagan Report, f e l l in 1955-56. The
coal industry was informed by government that black c o l l i e r s
should not be housed on land adjoining the c o l l i e r i e s , that
accommodation in approved single and married quarters should be
provided, and that the proportion of workers housed in married
quarters should not exceed 3# of the t o t a l black labour
complement, or 100 labourers, whichever was the lower. The
intention was, as Dr. Verwoerd's secretary explained, 'to avoid
the formation of black spots at Mines and Works.1 99
The timing of the move was determined by the closure of Burnside
co l l i ery in March 1955, after forty-eight years of working.• It
was during the early years of Burnside that many of the features
of the token system were developed, associated with men such as
Ben Sokehill, Willie Shum and Hugh Williamson. Closure made the
implications fu l ly apparent. Coal owners were informed that:
'The Native Affairs Department was anxious to avoid the
establ ishing of sett lements of Natives and their
famil ies where such sett lements had to be completley
abandoned and broken up when the Colliery became worked
out, as all Collieries must eventually become.1 (100)
The Natal Coal Owners' Society made strong representations
against the new regulations. They pointed to the v i ta l role the
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industry'played in the national economy, i t s importance to the
South African RailwayB, ESCOH, and above a l l , the Iron and Steel
industry. As the only source of true coking coal , which was a
v i t a l ingredient in the manufacturing of s t e e l , Natal was
crucially important to South Africa's industrialisation. These
arguments had worked in the 1920s and the 1930s, but not in the
1950s.
While the advent of an i d e o l o g i c a l l y r igid government was
undoubtedly an important factor, the changing circumstances of
the Natal coal trade have also to be taken into account. Prior
to 1950 the Natal coal industry was heavi ly dependent for
profitabil ity, and indeed v iab i l i ty , on the shipment traded The
small coal or 'natural arisinge' from the production of round
coal was either dumped, or sold at very low prices, in the early
days of the industry because there was no market for i t . With
the advent of ESCOH (1922) and ISC OR (1928), a market developed
for small coa l , but the price d i f f eren t ia l between round and
small coal which had arisen when small coal was held at a
discount, remained and was intensi f ied when government froze
inland prices in 1942. Natal c o l l i e r i e s sold coal to the inland
markets at a l o s s , but made up for th i s by the better prices
obtained for shipment coal . Although the shipment trade was
precarious, without i t the major Natal co l l i er i e s would have gone
under, not l eas t the Durban Navigation c o l l i e r i e s , which were
such an important source of coking c o a l . Government
interference in labour questions, which constituted a c r i t i c a l l y
important element in cost structures, would have intensified the
instabi l i ty of an already precarious industry, and threatened the
crucially important ingredient of coking coal in South Africa's
industrial development. This probably explains why the
government tolerated the Natal coal industry's own solution to
i t s labour problems even though th i s conf l icted with o f f i c i a l
policy. This probably also explains why, when opposition to the
token system forced some response, the action taken was so tardy
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and not always effective. This was particularly the case when
alternative solutions would have impinged on the interests of
gold mining and farming with their own insatiable demands for
cheap labour.
By 1955, however, the situation was different. The breakdown of
the South African Railways in 1950-51, and the ensuing transport
c r i s i s , had resulted in a total embargo being placed on export
coal so that local needs could be met. The Natal coal export
trade was smashed and recovery of this dimension would only come
in the 1970s when the 'oi l shock1 renewed interest in coal as a
source of energy. The Natal coal industry had to adjust to a
new pattern based on domestic consumption which promised a
steadier demand base. This process was assisted by ISCOR's
acquisition of the Durban Navigation collieries in 1954 in order
to secure coking coal supplies, and I3C0R and E3C0M contracts
with the major col l ier ies such as Hlobane, Northfield and
10 I
Kilbarchan in the Natal Navigation group. A casualty of this
process was the Dundee Coal Company, which had pioneered the coal
industry in Natal and had retained its significance as a leading
shipment colliery until i t ceased a l l coal-getting with the
closure of Burnside in March 1955, a move which precipitated
goverment action against s tab i l i sed labour on the Natal
col l ier ies . With the industry achieving a more domestic
orientat ion based on steadier demand, not leas t with the
assistance of i t s own instruments of ISCOR and ESCOM, the
government felt free to intervene in labour matters in order to
achieve its ideological purposes.
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